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Abstract: The international community was caught by surprise on 5 June 2017 when Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Egypt severed diplomatic ties 
with Qatar, accusing it of destabilizing the region. More than one year after this diplomatic rift, 
several questions remain unaddressed. This study focuses on the regional business costs of the 
year-long blockade on Qatar. We split the sample to compare the stock market performances 
of Qatar and its Middle Eastern neighbors before and after the Saudi-led Qatar boycott. We 
focus our attention on the conditional volatility process of stock market returns and 
risks related to financial interconnectedness. We show that the Gulf crisis had the most adverse 
impact on Qatar together with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Although not to the same degree as 
these three countries, Bahrain and Egypt were also harmfully affected. But shocks to the 
volatility process tend to have short-lasting effects. Moreover, the total volatility spillovers to 
and from others increase but moderately after the blockade. Overall, the quartet lobbying efforts 
did not achieve the intended result. Our findings underscore Qatar’s economic vulnerability but 
also the successful resilience strategy of this tiny state. The coordinated diplomatic efforts of 
Qatar have been able to fight the economic and political embargo.   
Keywords: 2017 Gulf crisis; stock markets; volatility; risk spillovers. 
JEL Classification: F30, F36, F65, G11, G15. 
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1. Introduction 
The policy disagreements at the center of the rift between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors 
seem not to be new. The anti-Qatar bloc has long regarded Qatar as too friendly to Iran, too 
annoying in its backing of Al Jazeera media network, without ignoring its perceived role 
in promoting the Muslim Brotherhood. Even though a variety of issues have been raised against 
Qatar, the most potent has been the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia’s strong 
feeling of annoyance over avowed Qatar’s support for Islamist movements. In addition, the 
competition between Qatar and the UAE for the leadership as the region’s biggest financial 
hub. These developments put pressure on the Gulf region as an enduring political and security 
alliance, which became tangible in a diplomatic crisis that happened in 2014. At that time, Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors to Qatar since Doha did not put into 
effect a security agreement about non-interference in the internal affairs of the other GCC 
states. Nevertheless, their contemporary infighting exists in another dimension and might 
prompt a strategic shift in how the world looks at the geopolitics of the GCC. Indeed, the 
collective decision by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt to cut diplomatic and 
economic ties with Qatar on 5 June 2017 with a green light from President Donald Trump, has 
rattled nerves sending shockwaves around the world. These unprecedented tensions have 
exacerbated the uncertainty over the economic consequences of this crisis. The Qatari stock 
market lost about 10 percent in market value over the first four weeks of the boycott. Other 
GCC stock markets also fell in response to the blockade, though with varying extent.  The 
Qatar’s blockade disrupted supply chains, harmed the flow of goods and services, and provoked 
anxiety amongst many Gulf firms. Many businesses feared that escalating tensions could have 
serious consequences on business deals across the whole region. 
Although there are a number of significant papers exploring the effects of economic, 
macroeconomic and financial uncertainty on asset price dynamics (Antonakakis et al. 2016; 
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Balcilar et al. 2016; Beckmann et al. 2017; Bouoiyour et al. 2018, etc.), rather less attention 
has been paid to the geopolitical risk and its impacts on international business. The vast 
majority of these studies indicate that the unstable political scene can have a pronounced 
impact on stock markets, portfolio allocation and diversification opportunities. The political 
turmoil exerts a significant influence on economic performance and asset prices (for instance, 
Guidolin and La Ferrara 2010). Likewise, geopolitical frictions and tensions lead to highest 
levels of uncertainty and prompt an ineffaceable mark on global markets (for example, 
Schneider and Troeger 2006; Zussman et al. 2008; Choudhry 2010). Conditional upon the 
type of the event, the effect of geopolitical uncertainty can be short-lived, have longer lasting 
impacts or yielding to shifts in markets affecting portfolio allocation and diversification 
decisions (inter alia: Pástor and Veronesi 2013; Kollias et al. 2013; Aslam and Kang 2015; 
Omar et al. 2016).  
The escalated diplomatic tensions between Qatar and its Middle Eastern neighbors may 
cost them billions of dollars by slowing trade, investment and economic growth as it struggles 
with oil price collapse. During these times of distress, international investors and portfolio 
managers get poked and start to question the efficacy of their investment strategies. In fact, the 
most immediate impacts on businesses were debated intensively since the announcement of 
Qatar’s isolation and it is still being debated, particularly because there is no sign of a resolution 
in sight to a diplomatic row between Qatar and its neighbors. Given these considerations, the 
present research seeks to investigate the business consequences of 2017 Gulf crisis. While there 
is no accordance on the relative importance of the costs of this crisis, we may get a feel of the 
possible boycott consequences by (1) comparing the conditional volatility process of the stock 
markets of Qatar and the boycotting countries before and after the blockade; and (2) testing 
whether this Gulf crisis has exacerbated the risk spillovers across the region. Stock markets 
may move together at times when traders and investors do not want them to (in particular, in 
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times of heightened uncertainty) thus limiting the opportunities of portfolio diversification. As 
the portfolio risk control is a vital part of investment management, an accurate assessment of 
stock market volatility spillovers during the recent Qatar crisis would help investors to seek the 
best possible strategy to effectively manage volatility that is lowering portfolio returns. 
Various GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive Conditionally Heteroscedastic) 
extensions are used to measure the volatility of stock markets before and after the Qatar’s 
isolation. In general, the GARCH-type modeling allows depicting financial markets in which 
volatility can change, becoming extreme during periods of distress or sudden events and low 
during relatively calm periods. A simple regression model does not account for this variation 
in volatility exhibited in financial markets. GARCH processes differ substantially 
from homoskedastic econometric techniques, which suppose constant volatility and are utilized 
in basic ordinary least squares . The latter consists of lessening the deviations between data 
points and a regression line to fit those points. With asset returns, volatility is likely to vary 
significantly over specific time- periods and depend on past variance, making a homoskedastic 
model not optimal. GARCH models, being autoregressive, are conditional upon past squared 
observations and past variances to model for current variance. GARCH processes are widely 
employed in finance owing to their abilities to reduce errors in forecasting by controlling for 
errors in prior forecasting and, in turn, improving the accuracy of evolving predictions. 
Moreover, this study investigates the stock market volatility spillovers among Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt by performing the forecast-error variance decomposition 
framework of a generalized Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model proposed by Diebold and 
Yilmaz (2012). The assessment of the interconnectedness of stock markets is of paramount 
importance for the understanding of a crisis and its propagation mechanism. Spillover effects 
in equity markets have been extensively evaluated in the extant literature (for example, Diebold 
and Yilmaz 2009; Engle et al. 2013). Throughout this study, we focus on the stock market 
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volatility spillovers among Qatar and the boycotting countries while considering the uncertainty 
surrounding the Qatar diplomatic crisis. This method enables to assess the direction of spillover 
effects between various markets in an effort to identify the net transmitters or the net receivers 
of risk spillovers. To the best of our knowledge, it remains underexplored in recent empirical 
research. Such analyses would be useful for both portfolio risk managers and designers of 
policies aimed at safeguarding against increased political uncertainty surrounding the 2017 
Qatar-GCC crisis.  
Our findings reveal that the economic implications of the Qatar’s isolation are likely to 
be costly to Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For Bahrain and Egypt, the effect appears limited 
so far. After the blockade, the equities of Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE become more volatile 
and relatively more responsive to bad news. However, this volatility does not persist. Besides, 
our results suggest that the uncertainty surrounding the 2017 Gulf crisis increase, even partially, 
the volatility spillovers across Qatar, GCC and Egyptian stock markets. In short, our results 
suggest that the boycott did not achieve the expected outcome. The fact that the three main 
protagonists (i.e., Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) reacted in the same way to this crisis can 
be interpreted as a sort of victory for Qatar. The latter has shown resilience and a rapid and 
efficient adaptation. We advance throughout this research the main causes of this blockade and 
the strategy put in place by this tiny state to resist to Saudi and Emirati dominance. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some insights 
about how the 2017 Gulf crisis started. Section 3 describes the methodology and the data. 
Section 4 reports and discusses the main empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper and 
provides some economic implications of the Qatar diplomatic crisis.  
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2. Qatar-Gulf crisis : What we need to know ? 
2.1.   Saudi Arabia’s dream of becoming the dominant Arab and Muslim 
power 
Saudi Arabia appears as the greatest regional power, because of its massive oil wealth, 
and also because of its new ambitions. The policy of wide-scale public works implemented by 
the government as well as foreign direct investment and banking and financial soundness have 
enabled Saudi Arabia to become the number one regional economy. Nevertheless, the economy 
of Saudi Arabia is entirely based on oil. The drop in oil prices since June 2014 created a certain 
obsession among Saudis with economic and political decline. Today, gigantic waves of change 
are sweeping across the Middle East region. The appointment of Prince Mohamed bin Salman 
(or MBS, as he is commonly referred to) as Crown Prince is part of this strategy. Previously it 
required the consent of the king’s brothers and half-brothers of the king to pass on a project. 
Today, efficiency prevails. One should remember that the tradition in Saudi Arabia consisted 
of passing the ‘Royal Scepter’ among the sons of the kingdom founder, Ibn Saud, and not from 
father to son. This was a part of the internal politics driven by Ibn Saud many wives and dozens 
of children. When Saudi Arabia’s king Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz died in January 2015 at the 
age of 90, the candidates for his replacement were no longer young men. Nevertheless, the 
transfer of the role to the next generation intensified anxiety of an internal civil war breaking 
out between many princes, a war that might have damaged the existence of the House of Saud. 
To deal with increasing fears, the successor was his half-brother Salman who enjoyed the entire 
confidence of the other brothers. When the brother designated as Crown Prince was very old 
(about 80) and with failing health, royal decisions would be lengthy preventing the system from 
functioning effectively. Hence the mini-revolution that happened this year with the appointment 
of Prince MBS as Crown Prince. MBS was the sixth brother. Two main objectives are clearly 
identified. On the one hand, the achievement of a diversified economy and on the other hand, 
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the ambition to embody the Sunni world, while associating Prince Mohamed Ben Zayed, the 
strong man of Abu Dhabi. MBS is taking the example of Abu Dhabi to develop its economy 
(Lavergne, 2018). 
The tiny oil- and gas-rich Gulf state of Qatar has been a forerunner in this way. Indeed, 
during the last two decades or so, Qatar became one of the most influential countries of the 
Persian Gulf region and the Middle East. For a country established only in 1971 and with one 
of the smallest geographic and demographic sizes in the Middle East, Qatar became a surprising 
powerbroker dominantly owing to its financial muscle to project power and influence across 
the Middle East and North Africa region. Since the start of the Arab Spring in late 2010, the 
regional landscape has changed, and so has Qatar’s policies. During the Arab Spring, Qatar 
moved away from its traditional foreign policy role as diplomatic mediator to embrace change 
in the Middle East and North Africa and to take an interventionist role as a leading supporter 
of the protest movements in the Middle East and North Africa. It is therefore not surprising to 
believe that the challenge launched in Qatar by Crown Prince MBS, along with three other 
countries in the region –Bahrain, Egypt1 and UAE– is aimed at restoring the threatened 
supremacy of Saudi Arabia on the Arab and Muslim world and restore the strategic partnership 
of the United States with Saudi Arabia. In other words, the 
blockade imposed against Qatar by Saudi Arabia is not a matter of chance, but enters into a 
logic of Sunni world domination. The Qatar’s challenge to Saudi Arabia is exacerbated by the 
fact that it adheres to Wahhabi creed. More accurately, Qatar’s alternative adaptation of 
Wahhabism coupled with a long-standing links with the Muslim Brotherhood, make its 
relationship with Saudi Arabia more complicated and upraise it to a serious threat. The 
                                                            
1 Well prior to the blockade against Qatar, Egypt was a primary battleground for GCC countries striving for 
international influence. Even though Qatar backed the Muslim Brotherhood, SaudiA rabia and the UAE supported 
the military regime of President Abdel Fatah al-Sissi. This explains to some extent how Egypt wound up in the 
center of a Gulf Cooperation Council conflicts with Qatar.  
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appointment of Prince MBS therefore has a dual purpose: economic efficiency and supremacy 
(Lavergne, 2018). 
We realize, therefore, that the boycott hides a more insidious rivalry between Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar. To this ‘inter-Sunni’ rivalry one can add the rivalry between Saudi Arabia 
(Sunni) and Iran (Shiite). After the Geneva Agreements imposing strict controls on Iran’s most 
sensitive nuclear work, Iran offered many opportunities to the Western business communities. 
This county has economic potential: Iran has an educated, urbanized and tech-astute population. 
It has a literacy rate of over 95 percent. The Yemen War should show the world, but especially 
the Western countries, the capacity of Saudi Arabia to defend its interests of the ‘free’ world, 
threatened by Iranian Shiite power. Likewise, this operation should assert the supremacy of the 
Wahhabi kingdom by bringing together a coalition of Arab-Muslim “friends”. This show of 
force (in particular, boycott against Qatar and the Houthi offensive) may serve as a powerful 
signal given to the other partners of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), reminding them of 
the Saudi leadership in the Middle East region. 
2.2.   David vs. Goliath? A misleading asymmetry 
 With a population of 250,000 and a surface area of 11,586 km2, it can be claimed that 
Qatar is a dwarf compared to Saudi Arabia (a population of 33 million and a surface area of 
2,253,690 km2, according to the World Bank collection of development indicators). By 
shutting down all land, sea, and air crossings with the tiny energy-rich nation, the Saudi-led 
quarter anticipated that the surrender of Qatar is only a matter of days. The reality, however, is 
much different. As a small, vulnerable country situated in an unstable Middle Eastern politics, 
Qatar faces several challenges. Nevertheless, the tiny Qatar has used income from its wide gas 
reserves to bankroll its ambitious plans. Regardless of its size, it has played a significant 
leadership role, with a remarkable power in the Arab world. Qatar is also classified by the 
United Nations as the country with the highest human development among the Arab states. Also 
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and in an attempt to prevent the damage from neighboring disputes, Qatar has often tried to 
strengthen its diplomatic relationship with multiple regional and international actors, by 
presenting itself as a friendly and helpful player. One cannot ignore the role of mediation2 in 
branding Qatar’s image on a political level.  
 It must be emphasized here that the Saudis, Emiraties and Qataris have familial 
relationships, implying that long-running family rivalries may be considered as one of the 
causes behind the big political issues. This may explain, to some extent, why the ongoing Qatar 
crisis poses a major dilemma for Kuwait and Oman.  These two Arab Gulf states share the same 
interests in terms of preventing the Qatar crisis from prolonging. As competition of dominance 
intensifies, Officials in Kuwait City and Muscat are wary, as much as Qatar, about the Saudi 
leadership, exacerbated by Mohammed bin Salman’s rise to power. Rather than following 
Saudi Arabia and its allies, Kuwait and Oman stayed neutral. The neutrality of these two Gulf 
countries provided leverage for Qatar, albeit without direct support. But it must be mentionned 
at this stage that Kuwait appears as the main mediator among the warring parties, and 
Oman endorsed diplomacy while enhancing its links with Qatar. Beyond the reforms 
undertaken by the Qatari authorities to deal with the crisis, there have been other reasons why 
the impact of the blockade imposed aganist Qatar has not been as hurtful as it might have been. 
Among the potential reasons, one can cite the Omani and Kuwaiti foreign policy strategies. 
Even though Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain have imposed their trade and investment 
boycott against Qatar, Oman and Kuwait have chosen to stay resolutely above the fray.  
 To this we must add the role played by the US in this region. The US president Donald 
Trump accused Qatar in June 2017 of funding terrorism. Then and while attempting to change 
Trump’s mind about Qatar, the emir of Qatar has spent millions of dollars hiring lobbyists and 
powerful American brokers to Doha. A few months later, Trump thanked Qatar for its efforts 
                                                            
2 One of the major factors in changing the way in which Qatar is viewed regionally and globally is the creation 
of the Al-Jazeera Channel. 
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to combat terrorism and extremism in all forms in an apparent contradiction of previous 
statements. It must be stressed, nevertheless, that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been 
indispensable backers of Egypt since the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi. In an attempt to 
support the Egypt’s president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have employed 
a number of financial tools, such as deposits into the Egyptian Central Bank, donations of oil 
and gas shipments, and promises of increased foreign direct investments in different sectors. In 
short, Saudi Arabia and the UAE has emerged as the leading supporters of Egypt’s military 
rulers. As for Bahrain, it has lost all autonomy since the Saudi-led intervention on mid-March 
2011 to assist the Bahraini government in subduing an anti-government protests in the country. 
This multiplication of actors does not stop there. The Turkish president has been a major 
supporter of Doha since the quartet cutties and imposed boycott against Qatar . Also and 
according to Qatar’s Chamber,  Turkey is one of Qatar’s major  customers for non-
oil exports.  Likewise, Qatar’s pledge of aid to Turkey has strengthened the two countries’ 
alliance. In August 2018, the emir of Qatar pledged to invest 15 billion dollars in Turkey, which 
grapples with a currency crisis that made the lira collapse by about 45 percent against the US 
dollar.  In the same order of ideas, Doha sees its links with Tehran as vital to its economic and 
security interests. Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani also announced his country’s support of 
Doha during this crisis. Qatar’s ties to Iran are of paramount importance to guard its natural 
resources, as the countries share the biggest gas field in the world. Since the blockade, Iran and 
Qatar ties have improved. As a response to the 2017 Gulf crisis, Iran voiced its support for the 
Qatari government, consolidating its alliance with the small Gulf state. Iran’s trade with Doha 
totaled 250 million dollars in2018, registering a sharp rise of 2.5 percent compared with 2017. 
 In sum, the escalated tension between Qatar and the quartet is in many ways a friction 
about the exercise of economic foreign affairs. Qatar utilizes its economic resources to 
support Muslim Brotherhood, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE see this support as extremely 
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threatening to their own regimes. These competing visions have continuously tried to achieve 
their regional dominance by reinforcing aid and investment patterns which have the potential 
to contort the political economy of the whole region. By means of relatively new econometric 
techniques, we will see throughout the rest of our study, the consequences of this stunning 
political development on the subject of interest, in particular whether an escalating Gulf 
geopolitical crisis has intensified the market volatility in the region. More globally, this study 
seeks to identify the winners and the losers of Qatar standoff. It is important to remember that 
Qatar has always been aware of its vulnerability and has managed its business with dexterity 
(multiplying foreign partners, strengthening the management of gas resources, and pursuing 
investment mediation) despite the economy’s reliance on the hydrocarbon sector. Certainly, 
this tiny state is confronted with several challenges due to the diversity of its population as well 
as its transformation from a traditional society to a modern state, with all that may involve in 
terms of changing societal and cultural norms. All this underscores the complicacy of the 
analysis of this region and the intricacy of the interests of several powers, without overlooking 
the fact that this region is the holder of the largest oil reserves in the world. Given all that, the 
match between the two protagonists (i.e., Saudi Arabia and Qatar) is not between unbalanced 
forces as one might think. Qatar is not fully isolated and Saudi Arabia is not as powerful as the 
statistics might suggest. This can be advanced as an element of explanation for Qatar’s 
resilience of the blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia and its allies. 
 
3. Methodology and data 
This study performs a variety of econometric methods (a) to answer what Qatar 
diplomatic crisis means for the stock market performances of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
Bahrain and Egypt, and (b) to explore the stock market volatility interdependence between 
Qatar and the boycotting countries before and after the 2017 Gulf crisis. 
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3.1. Measuring volatility using GARCH-type modeling 
Although it seems not easier to quantify the full costs of 2017 Gulf crisis, the present 
research uses relatively new techniques in an attempt to provide fresh insights that may help 
policymakers to make the best possible decisions to deal with uncertain exposure. Given the 
challenges in consistently capturing the dynamic relationship between geopolitical uncertainty 
and stock markets, this paper seeks to compare the stock market volatility of Qatar and the 
boycotting countries before and after the blockade. There is a wide-spread perception in the 
financial press that volatility of asset returns has been changing markedly. The standard models 
consider that the distribution of asset returns is stable, implying that economic agents formulate 
their expectations at the same way over time. This evidence is far from reality, since during 
periods of great agitation (i.e., adverse changes, crisis, political tensions and sudden shocks, 
etc.), the variance-covariance of returns may move excessively. As a result, the standard 
techniques are unable to properly capture the conditional volatility process and to account for 
transitory and permanent components, shifts possibly stemming in the investigated variables. It 
is therefore relevant to examine the validity of this perception and to determine the features of 
changing volatility dynamics. Table A.1. (Appendix) succinctly reviews different GARCH 
models that account for various features (asymmetry, nonlinearity, regime shifts, etc.) that may 
be embedded in data. Since no single measure of volatility has dominated the existing empirical 
literature, the appropriate model able to properly depict the volatility of stock indices for Qatar 
and the boycotting countries is selected throughout this study using the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC). The latter helps to judge the quality of conditional variance estimation in terms 
in terms of trade-off between goodness of fit and model parsimony. 
3.2. Measuring the volatility spillover effects 
After evaluating the changing volatile behaviors of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain 
and Egypt stock markets to the 2017 Gulf crisis, we now concentrate on the impact of this 
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diplomatic crisis on the extent of volatility transmission across these countries. This work does 
not focus on the effect over the day relative to the boycott announcement only; rather it assesses 
the spillover effects before and after the decision of blockade on Qatar.3 To this end, we include 
the conditional volatility series4 to a generalized VAR framework (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2012). 
The conducted volatility transmission analysis covers three aspects.  
First, we determine the total volatility spillover index which measures what proportion 
of the volatility forecast error variances comes from spillovers. Let: 
ttt xx εφ += −1           (1) 
where  ),( ,2,1 ttt xxx = and φ is a 2*2 parameter matrix; x will be considered as a vector of 
the considered stock volatilities. 
By covariance stationarity, the moving average representation of the VAR is denoted: 
tt Lx ε)(Θ=               (2) 
where 1)()( −−=Θ LIL φ  
Second, we consider 1-step-ahead forecasting. The optimal forecast is given by: 
 ttt xx φ=+ ,1                  (3) 
with corresponding 1-step-ahead error vector: 
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3 We test whether the volatility spillovers among Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE stock returns has 
been exacerbated over the period witnessing heightened uncertainty over the 2017 Gulf crisis. 
4The conditional volatility of each stock index is determined through the best GARCH model chosen using the 
the Akaike information criterion. 
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In particular, the variance of the 1-step-ahead error in forecasting
2
12,0
2
11,0,1 aisax t + , and the 
variance of the 1-step-ahead error in forecasting 2 22,0
2
21,0,2 aisax t + . There exist two possible 
spillovers in our example: x1tshocks that exert influence on the forecast error variance of 
x2t(with contribution 2 21,0a ), and x2tshocks that affect the forecast error variance of x1t(with 
contribution 2 12,0a ). Hence the total spillover effect is equal to +
2
12,0a
2
21,0a .Having outlined 
the Spillover Index in a first-order two-variable VAR, it is easier to generalize this to a dynamic 
framework for a pth-order N-variable case. 
Third, we quantify the net directional volatility spillovers for stock indices, in order to 
identify which of the considered countries are net volatility importers, and which of them are 
stress volatility exporters. At this stage, we decompose the total spillover index for stock 
volatilities into all of the forecast error variance components for variable i coming from shocks 
to variable j, for all i and j.  
3.3.Data and descriptive statistics 
The data of Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE stock price indices were 
collected from DataStream (Thomson Reuters). To evaluate the business costs of Qatar 
diplomatic crisis on Qatar and its neighbors, we compare two equal periods prior to and post 
the blockade on Qatar. The boycott decision was on 05 June 2017, which we subsequently view 
as the announcement day. So, this study compares the performances of these stock markets over 
equal periods before the boycott (Period 1: from 03 April 2016 to 04 June 2017; 428 
observations), and after the blockade (Period 2: from 06 June 2017 to 07August 2018; 428 
observations). We transformed all the variables by taking natural logarithms to correct for 
heteroskedasticity and dimensional differences. Descriptive statistics for series are reported in 
Table 1. Yet, at this stage (i.e., preliminary analysis), quite interesting results were drawn. We 
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note that the volatility increased for all the stock markets under study by moving from period 1 
(i.e., before the blockade, Panel A, Table 1) to period 2 (i.e., after the blockade, Panel B, Table 
1), though with varying extent. The most volatile stock markets are those of Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar. The least volatile stock market is that of Bahrain. After the 2017 Gulf crisis, we notice 
that all the equities are likely to be negatively skewed, with the exception of Bahrain. Such 
heterogeneity in this times of market stress highlight that market participants may enjoy 
portfolio diversification opportunities.  
 
Table 1. Statistical properties of country-level stock returns:                                                        
Before and after the blockade on Qatar 
 QATAR SAUDI ARABIA UAE BAHRAIN EGYPT 
Panel A : Period 1 : Before the blockade on Qatar 
 Mean  1.10E-05 -0.001023  0.002128  0.001916  0.000190 
 Median -0.002028  0.077655  0.031826  0.031738  0.010806 
 Maximum  0.438927  1.677135  0.387325  0.166263  0.804977 
 Minimum -0.338575 -4.582749 -0.823530 -0.698647 -0.981078 
 Std. Dev.  0.181631  0.374123  0.162142  0.123620  0.226584 
 Skewness  0.244617 -5.185766 -1.539648 -1.933086 -0.400171 
 Kurtosis  4.225992  58.77320  6.920278  8.157172  5.448237 
 Jarque-Bera  31.07290  57391.57  443.1699  740.8627  118.3137 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
Panel B : Period2 : Afterthe blockade on Qatar 
 Mean  0.000316  0.003419 -0.000778  0.000652  0.000171 
 Median -0.003971  0.072908  0.042192  0.039204  0.008809 
 Maximum  0.537433  1.684439  0.535590  0.164509  0.853528 
 Minimum -0.534400 -4.278205 -1.631654 -0.456515 -0.942518 
 Std. Dev.  0.297125  0.337480  0.214524  0.125851  0.239081 
 Skewness - 0.603860 -5.357073 -2.740098 1.122593 -0.270353 
 Kurtosis  4.970826  65.29266  16.14385  3.759154  5.054545 
 Jarque-Bera  70.03692  71247.18  3616.481  100.1730  80.49105 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 
Fig 1 confirms that the stock price indices for most countries (especially, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE) become more volatile after the blockade in Qatar.  
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Fig 1. Stock market returns by country: Before and after the blockade 
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Panel B. Period 2: After the blockade on Qatar 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Volatility 
To choose the best GARCH model able to measure the volatilities of Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt’s stock indices, we use the Akaike information criterion. 
Based on this criterion, the optimal GARCH extensions chosen to capture the volatility of Qatar 
stock price index is the standard GARCH model for the period 1 and the Exponential GARCH 
model for the period 2.5 The GARCH-type modeling has been and continues to be very valuable 
tool in finance and economics since the seminal paper of Engle (1982). Engle (1982) proposed 
to model time-varying conditional variance with Auto- Regressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) processes using lagged disturbances. He argued that a high ARCH 
order is required to properly capture the dynamic behavior of conditional variance. The 
Generalized ARCH (GARCH) model of Engle and Bollerslev (1986) fulfills this requirement 
as it is based on an infinite ARCH specification which minimizes the number of estimated 
parameters, denoted as: 
                                                         (5) 
where ,  and  are the parameters to estimate. 
The Exponential-GARCH model introduced by Nelson (1991) contributes to the 
standard GARCH model by allowing to control for asymmetry. This model specified the 
conditional variance in a logarithmic form: 
               (6) 
                                                            
5The detailed Akaike information criterion results will be available for interested readers upon request.   
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where , , , are the parameters to estimate, and zt the standardized value of error. 
For Saudi Arabia, the optimal model based on the AIC information criterion able to 
capture best the stock market index volatility is the Threshold-GARCH model for the two 
periods (before and after the 2017 Gulf crisis). The Threshold-GARCH developed by Zakoin 
(1994) accommodates structural breaks in volatility. It allows describing the regime shifts in 
the volatility, denoted as: 
                   (7)                             
 where , ,  and  are the parameters to estimate. 
        For the UAE and Egyptian stock indices, the most appropriate GARCH model selected 
based on the same information criterion is the Exponential-GARCH model for the period 1 and 
the Threshold-GARCH model for the period 2.  
For Bahrain stock price index, the Integrated-GARCH model seems the most 
appropriate volatility measure for period 1, while the Threshold-GARCH is the best volatility 
indicator for period 2. In many analyses of the variables behaviour of volatility, a vexing 
question regards the persistence of long shocks to conditional variance. The Integrated GARCH 
model is a part of a large class of models with a property called “persistent variance”, which 
assumes that current information is still substantial for the forecasts of the conditional variances 
for all time horizons. 
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where iα , jβ , ω  and γ  are the parameters to estimate. 
The estimates are reported in Table 2. Our results indicate that the volatile behaviors of 
the stock price indices for all the countries under study change slightly by moving from the 
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period prior to the Qatar crisis (period 1; Panel A, Table 2) to the post-boycott (period 2; Panel 
B, Table 2).  All the stock markets become more volatile in response to the blockade, but such 
volatility does not persist. In particular, the duration of persistence is far from one for all cases, 
and thus we did not find any evidence of long memory in the conditional variance.  The 
asymmetrical effect is positive and statistically significant for all the considered stock markets 
implying that the effect of bad news on the conditional variance exceeds that of good news. 
Indeed, the degree of asymmetry (
α
γα + ), which measures the relative influence of bad news 
on volatility seems important for the majority of cases (it amounts 1.00 for all cases). The degree 
of asymmetry is still pronounced for the two periods, confirming the moderate effect of Qatar 
diplomatic crisis on Gulf region equity markets. 
Table 2. Volatility’ parameters by country: Before and after the blockade on Qatar 
 QATAR SAUDI ARABIA UAE BAHRAIN EGYPT 
Panel A: Period 1:Before blockade on Qatar   
Mean equation 
 
 
-0.013*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0272 
(0.2464) 
1.8134*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.328* 
(0.0567) 
-0.413***                           
(0.0001) 
Lagged returns 0.1752*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0723 
(0.4299) 
0.127*** 
(0.0002) 
0.155*** 
(0.0000) 
0.139*             
(0.040) 
Variance equation 
 
 
0.0007*** 
(0.0004) 
0.272*** 
(0.0000) 
0.214* 
(0.0362) 
0.311* 
(0.0104) 
0.204*** 
(0.0009) 
 
 
-0.042*** 
(0.0000) 
0.728*** 
(0.0000) 
0.441 
(0.8229) 
0.076** 
(0.0055) 
0.023** 
(0.0055) 
 
 
0.6354*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.008 
(0.8445) 
0.221* 
(0.0303) 
0.571** 
(0.0034) 
0.514** 
(0.0026) 
 
--- 0.001* 
(0.0114) 
0.016*** 
(0.0000) 
--- 0.0002* 
(0.0153) 
The duration of persistence: 
 
0.59 0.72 0.74 0.64 0.49 
The leverage effect: 
 
 
--- 0.001 0.016 --- 0.0002 
Panel B: Period 2:After blockade on Qatar 
Mean equation 
 
 
0.0912*** 
(0.0003) 
0.401*** 
(0.0000) 
0.748* 
(0.0617) 
0.338 
(0.3371) 
0.293** 
(0.0014) 
Lagged returns -0.0634* 
(0.0271) 
-0.1032* 
(0.0218) 
0.354*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.4214* 
(0.0124) 
-0.4256** 
(0.0078) 
C
ω
α
β
γ
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C
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Variance equation 
   
 
0.0145** 
(0.0059) 
0.0166* 
(0.0414) 
-0.632*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0451* 
(0.0310) 
0.0452* 
(0.0357) 
 
 
0.368*** 
(0.0005) 
0.3019** 
(0.0038) 
0.7839*** 
(0.0000) 
0.130** 
(0.0036) 
0.030** 
(0.0036) 
 
 
0.352** 
(0.0044) 
0.5107 
(0.1349) 
0.0145*** 
(0.0000) 
0.533*** 
(0.0004) 
0.418*** 
(0.0004) 
 
0.0007*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0012* 
(0.0103) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0000) 
0.001** 
(0.0672) 
0.031 
(0.211) 
The duration of persistence: 
 
0.73 0.81 0.79 0.67 0.51 
The leverage effect: 
 
0.0007 0.0012 0.0004 0.001 0.031 
Notes: : the reaction of conditional variance; α: the ARCH effect; β: the GARCH effect; : the leverage effect;(.): the p-
value; p-value<0.01: ***; p-value<0.05: **; p-value<0.1:*.With respect to the results of AIC information criterion, we select 
one lag for all the specifications. 
 
The conditional variances processes displayed in Fig 2 indicate that the persistence of 
stock market volatility differs substantially from one country to another and from the period 
before the boycott to the period post-blockade. After the boycott, the conditional variance 
appears more persistent in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
 
Fig. 2. Conditional variance of stock returns by country: Before and after the blockade 
on Qatar 
         Panel A: Period 1: Before the blockade on Qatar Panel B: Period 2: After the blockade on Qatar 
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For comparison purpose, we tested the effect of this crisis on Kuwait and Oman stock 
markets. This would allow us to assess whether a neutral reaction may help to avoid volatility 
spillovers. Kuwait has attempted to mediate the spat between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors. Its 
good links with all parties of the GCC and equal distance from each of them have enabled 
Kuwait to act in a neutral manner. Oman is uninvolved in the 2017 Gulf crisis and cannot 
undertake such a mission because of tense relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE as a 
consequence of strong Oman’s ties with Iran. From Table A.2 and Fig A.2 (preliminary results), 
we note that the Kuwaiti and Oman’s stock markets do not change fundamentaly by moving 
from the period prior to the blockade to the post-boycott period. The volatility increase 
modestly after the blockade on Qatar. We select then the best optimal model for each stock 
price index based on AIC information criterion. The findings derived from the optimal GARCH 
model of each stock market (Table A.3, Appendix) reveal that the crisis affect modestly the 
volatility of stock markets. We note a relatively moderate increase in the duration of persistence. 
Fig A.3 (Appendix) confirm that the volatility increase weakly after the blockade. For the two 
periods, the Kuwaiti stock market and Muscat shares seem more responsive to good news               
(i.e., negative leverage effect ; see Table A.3).  
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4.2. Volatility spillovers across Qatar and the boycotting countries 
In the aftermath of a sudden political decision, such as the boycott against Qatar, the 
associated ramifications on the stock markets, particularly the regional ones, are questionable. 
In addition to the investigation of the effect of the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis on the volatility, 
speculative attitude and the efficiency of Qatar, GCC and Egyptian stock markets, we assess 
the financial spillover effect of the regional turmoil on Qatar and the boycotting countries. Table 
4 summarizes an approximate “input-output” decomposition of the total volatility spillover 
index.  In particular, based on the study of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), we decompose the 
spillover index into all of the forecast error variance components for variable i coming from 
shocks to variable j, for all i and j. The ijth entry is the estimated contribution to the forecast 
variance of market i, resulting from innovations to market j. The sum of variances in a row 
(column), excluding the contribution to its own volatilities (diagonal variances) corresponds to 
the effect on the volatilities of other stock markets. The last row in the table is the contribution 
to the volatilities of all markets from this particular market.  
Before the 2017 Qatar-Gulf crisis (Panel A, Table 3), the volatility spillovers to others 
(98.3%) is greater than the volatility spillovers from others (59.2%). After the blockade on 
Qatar (Panel B, Table 3), we clearly note that the volatility transmission to and from others 
increase but not strongly. In particular, our results reveal that for total volatility spillovers to 
others (107.7%) is stronger than total volatility spillovers from others (63.4%).  For Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE, the contribution to others is more important than the contribution from 
others; inversely for Bahrain and Egypt.  This holds true for the two periods under study. The 
important volatility transmission among GCC markets before and after the blockade can be 
explained by the increased financial sector integration among Gulf countries. Highly motivated 
by the necessity to enhance efficiency, GCC countries have taken prominent steps these last 
decades toward achieveing appropriate financial regulation and corporate governance 
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measures, which have in turn enabled to improve convergence across GCC financial systems. 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017) explored the extent of financial integration in the Gulf using 
capital flow data and equity prices. The study revealed that there is some improvement in 
regional financial integration. Although the Qatar diplomatic crisis has intensified the volatility 
spillovers, this effect does not appear pronounced. Even modestly, we note an increased risk 
spillover among Qatar, GCC and Egyptian stock markets by moving from period 1 (before the 
blockade) to period 2 (after the blockade). This can be viewed as a signal of limitations of 
portfolio diversification opportunities during this crisis period. 
Table 3. Stock market volatility spillovers across Qatar and the boycotting countries: Before 
and after the blockade on Qatar 
 Qatar Bahrain Saudi Arabia UAE Egypt Contribution from others 
Panel A. Period 1: Before the blockade on Qatar 
Qatar 58.7 7.3 14.5 12.7 3.6 8.6 
Bahrain 8.9 31.4 9.2 5.9 4.9 14.3 
Saudi Arabia 31.4 4.6 51.4 17.1 2.5 6.5 
UAE 7.4 5.1 8.1 41.7 1.6 5.9 
Egypt 1.9 3.4 6.7 8.4 40.3 12.9 
Contribution to others 19.8 9.8 26.0 24.2 7.2 59.2 
Contribution including own 79.8 41.2 77.4 65.9 47.5 36.8 
Panel B. Period 2: After the blockade on Qatar 
Qatar 63.9 9.7 23.4 14.9 4.2 11.9 
Bahrain 5.1 36.5 8.7 6.6 3.4 19.3 
Saudi Arabia 10.3 1.3 62.1 12.3 1.9 8.1 
UAE 9.7 4.5 7.3 55.9 1.3 6.8 
Egypt 2.7 2.0 11.9 9.3 61.5 17.3 
Contribution to others 53.4 7.2 20.9 17.6 8.6 63.4 
Contribution including own 117.3 102.7 83.0 73.5 70.1 43.6 
Notes: The values are calculated from variance decompositions based on 1-step-ahead forecasts. The optimal lag length for the 
VAR models is 3 for the two periods under study, determined by the Akaike Information Criterion. 
 
Thereafter, we determine the average net directional spillovers prior to and post-the 
Qatar diplomatic crisis, which is the difference between the “contribution to others” and the 
“contribution from others”.  This task permits to identify which from the stock markets under 
study is the most potential in exporting volatilities to the other countries during the boycott 
against Qatar.  The results are reported in Table 4. We show that the results change but not 
fundamentally after the recent Gulf crisis. Before the boycott, two groups of countries are 
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derived: Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are viewed as volatility transmitters; while Bahrain 
and Egypt are considered as risk receivers (Panel A, Table 4). After the crisis, we keep the same 
groups of countries, though with changing intensity of volatility spillovers. In particular, with 
an average net directional return spillover of 41.5%, the Qatar stock market appears the most 
influential in transmitting risk to others countries (Panel B, Table 4), followed by Saudi Arabia 
(12.8%) and UAE (10.8%). Nevertheless, the stock markets of Bahrain and Egypt - with 
negative volatility spillover indexes (-12.1% and -8.7%, respectively) - are regarded as net 
volatility receivers. The identification of volatility transmitters and receivers may help in 
designing effective hedging strategies. Investors can enhance their hedging and portfolio 
diversification by exploiting its knowledge with respect the way the risks associated to stock 
markets over the Qatar diplomatic crisis can be transmitted from one market to another. As 
hopes of swift resolution to the standoff seem increasingly remote, providing useful information 
regarding the directional spillovers should allow regulators undertake preventive strategies to 
mitigate the volatility transmission from the Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE to Bahrain and with 
less extent Egypt. This requires an effective management of financial risks by ensuring adequate 
regulation and supervision (Caffagi and Miller 2013). 
Table 4. The average net directional volatility spillovers across Qatar and the boycotting 
countries: Before and after the blockade on Qatar 
  
Contribution from 
others  
Contribution to 
others 
Average net directional 
spillover 
Panel A. Period 1: Before the blockade on Qatar 
Qatar 8.6 19.8 11.2 
Bahrain 14.3 9.8 -4.5 
Saudi Arabia 6.5 26.0 20.5 
UAE 5.9 24.2 18.3 
Egypt 12.9 7.2 -5.7 
Panel B. Period 2: After the blockade on Qatar 
Qatar 11.9 53.4 41.5 
Bahrain 19.3 7.2 -12.1 
Saudi Arabia 8.1 20.9 12.8 
UAE 6.8 17.6 10.8 
Egypt 17.3 8.6 -8.7 
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To ascertain the robustness of these results, we incorporated in the vector autoregressive 
(VAR) model, the equities of Kuwait and Oman. In doing so, the results remain robust to total 
volatility spillovers to others are still more pronounced than risk spillovers from others. We 
also confirm that the effect of Qatar crisis on the volatility transmission is relatively low (see 
Table A.4, Appendix). In addition, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain net volatility 
transmitters, while Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait and Oman are considered as volatility receivers (see 
Table A.5, Appendix). 
 
4.3.  Discussion of results: Heightened diplomatic tensions with limited economic 
repercussions 
 The analysis carried out showed that there is a real competition between the different 
countries for the regional leadership, and they each have strengths and limitations. Saudi Arabia 
can appear as a giant compared to other Gulf countries. However, this asymmetry is only 
apparent. Much diplomatic maneuvering succeeded in bringing a small state to convert a crisis 
targeting its leadership and sovereignty and aiming to eliminate its independence, and to 
successfully deal with economic uncertainty. This unprecedented crisis will escalate tensions 
between the protagonists in the region that is, by nature, very unstable. Our results reveal that 
while Qatar has been shaken by this crisis, the other countries are not left out, especially Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE. We try in the following to provide some answers to these questions: What 
are the main Qatar’s elements of strength? What are the regional and global factors of resilience 
that helped Qatar resist the blockade? How the Saudi-led blockade failed to achieve its goals? 
(i) Qatar’s economic resilience: The Qatar diplomatic dispute is the biggest 
political crisis to hit the Middle East in several years. The quartet has tried to 
strangle the Qatar’s economy through an unprecedented blockade in the recent 
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history. More than one year ago, an air, sea and land blockade was imposed on 
Qatar. Certainly, this blockade is not without consequences for this small country, 
especially that it was unprepared for such a major escalation. Qataris are likely to 
find it very difficult (if not impossible) to import their basic needs. Qatar is hugely 
dependent on imports by land and sea, and approximately 40 percent of its food 
came in via the land border with Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the crisis has put 
pressure on the Qatari riyal, and the country has been enforced to dip into its reserves 
to preserve its currency’s value against the dollar.6 Car sales also witnessed a 
gradual downward trend after the announcement of boycott. Likewise, the crisis has 
increasingly affected the tourism industry. Further, Qatar’s efforts to fight the 
ongoing blockade have worsened the budget deficit. In brief, the flashing lights of 
economic indicators were all red. However, Qatar’s wider reliance on extractive 
hydrocarbon resources allowed the country to conduct an active foreign policy. 
After a period of rising uncertainty, the Qatari authorities responded vigorously and 
quickly to the blockade. Since blockade imposed against Qatar, new maritime and 
air trade routes have opened, especially to Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. On the local 
scene, before the boycott, the local production covered 15 percent of domestic 
demand Qatar imported 80 percent of its food needs from Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE. After the blockade, Qatar plans to limit food imports by 60 per cent by 
adopting innovative production technologies to grow agricultural products in an 
effort to meet the market demand. Against the backdrop of the blockade, Qatar has 
proved that business is open as ever. In fact, the Qatari airline, surrounded by 
everywhere, has experienced rapid expansion this year, proudly standing as one of 
the world’s fastest-growing airlines. It has also announced the opening of twenty 
                                                            
6 Qatar has $340 billion in reserves that could help the Gulf country to circumvent the isolation by its neighboring 
countries. 
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new destinations. Similarly, see ports of Qatar, largely under-exploited until this 
blockade, have witnessed an increased growth. Also, the Qatar’s energy sector has 
shown greater resilience, adaptability and determination to lessen the harmful 
impact of the crisis. According to the2018 world Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
report released by International Gas Union, Qatar has retained its position as world’s 
major LNG exporter in 2017 in a sign of strength amid Gulf rift. Recently, Qatar 
has announced a biggest deal to supply liquefied natural gas to Beijing for the next 
twenty years. China will buy 3.4 million tonnes every year from Qatar. This would 
help to largely improve the Qatar’s position as a leading natural gas exporter over 
the long-run. Add to this that Qatar’s economic growth is expected to recover to 2.8 
per cent in 2018, and increase further to attain an average of 3 per cent in 2019, as 
growing energy receipts allow easing fiscal constraints (World Bank report, 2018). 
Qatar also adopted a new in 2017 which offers legal guarantees for domestic 
workers’ labor rights. This significant change is part of Doha’s efforts to enhance 
international perception of this small state as it seeks to fight the diplomatic isolation 
and escalated pressures from its neighbors. If this blockade showed the resilience of 
Qatar’s economy, it also highlights the incapacity of the boycotting countries to put 
it down. 
(ii) Saudi Arabia- A giant with feet of clay: The Saudi economy is the largest in the Arab 
world. It is highly dependent on oil. This country has the world’s second-largest 
proven petroleum reserves after Venezuela and it is the largest exporter of 
petroleum. Add to this, Saudi Arabia has the fifth-biggest proven natural gas 
reserves. Saudi Arabia is commonly regarded as an energy superpower. But since 
the 2014 oil price decline, the country is plagued by major economic hardships, 
which has forced it to reduce its public spending. Oil is still account for about 80 
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per cent of Saudi exports, and three-quarters of total tax revenue depend on it. The 
serious oil price collapse forced Saudi Arabia to undertake deeper changes to its 
economy. The Saudi government has imposed new taxes, including a 5 percent value 
added tax (VAT). It must be stressed that this is the first tax imposed in the country. 
The country has also accelerated its efforts to build a more diversified industrial 
economy, with new facilities for various sectors including chemicals, fertilizers, 
aluminum and cement. Regardless of Saudi Crown 
Prince’s unprecedented reform efforts, shifting to a diversified economic structure 
seems not easier for Saudi Arabia. This is attributed, even partially, to the fact that 
Saudi Arabia, as a “rentier state” and therefore, has had a limited incentive to spur 
the growth of any non-oil sector of its economy. Another major shift in Saudi Arabia 
could be the partial privatization of Saudi Aramco. Based on Bloomberg news, 
Saudi Aramco is one of the top-companies in the world by revenue. It is the world’s 
second-largest proven oil reserves, at more than 270 billion barrels. Accordingly, 
International Monetary Fund proclaims Saudi economy, which contracted by 0.9 per 
cent in 2017, is expected to grow by 2.2 per cent in 2018 and 2.4 per cent in 2019. 
However, the rise in the price of black gold will be insufficient to relieve the social 
pressures in Saudi Arabia, partly fueled by an increase in unemployment among 
young people under the age of 20 to 24 (42 per cent).Companies operating or 
planning to invest in Saudi Arabia face also a significant risk of corruption.7 The 
privatization of Saudi Aramco, which constitutes the barley point of this strategy of 
seduction, indefinitely postponed, according to Saudi sources. It is also difficult to 
attract foreign investors when Saudi officials do not provide information about the 
                                                            
7Corruption has long been endemic in Saudi Arabia, According to the 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index, 
corruption rank in Saudi Arabia averaged 62.47 from 2003 until 2017. 
30 
 
volume of reserves of proven oil reserves. Likewise, the company’s accounts have 
never been audited. For boosting international investors’ confidence and for Saudi 
Arabia’s economic reforms to carry credibility, there is an urgent necessity for 
greater transparency in how government finances are generated and dispersed. 
According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2017), 
inward investment into Riyadh dropped markedly in 2017, raising several questions 
regarding the prospects for the economic reform agenda being conducted by Crown 
Prince MBS. The case of the Saudi journalist killed inside the Saudi 
consulate in Istanbul, harmed kingdom image and will keep foreign investors’ 
fingers mightily on the pause button when it comes to allocating to the country.8 
 
5. Conclusions 
There is bountiful evidence that political uncertainty make financial markets 
significantly volatile.  Accordingly, Poon and Granger (2003) argued that precise prediction of 
volatility is highly prominent for at least four reasons. First, when the volatility is interpreted 
as uncertainty, it becomes a potential input to make appropriate investment decisions and 
portfolio allocation. Second, analyzing the volatility dynamics is of paramount importance in 
the pricing of derivative securities. Third, financial risk management necessitates an effective 
prediction of volatility as a requisite input to risk management for financial institutions (Rapach 
et al. 2008 ; Gil-Alana et al. 2014 ; Yaya et al. 2015). Fourth, the equity market volatility can 
have large repercussions on the economy as a whole through its impact on real economic 
activity and public confidence. Certainly, estimates of market volatility during periods of rising 
uncertainty can be perceived as efficacious measure for the vulnerability of financial markets 
                                                            
8The Saudi equity market dropped by about 7.2 per cent between October 10-14 while the story was developing. 
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and the economy, and can allow policymakers designing the best possible policies. In short, a 
good prediction of the process of volatility has relevant implications for investment decisions, 
portfolio allocation, the pricing of derivative securities and risk management.  
Given this, the present study seeks to examine the impact of the coalition of Arab 
countries led by Saudi Arabia imposed a historic land, maritime, and air blockade on the stock 
market volatility in the Gulf region and risk spillovers across these markets. Despite our 
awareness that it is difficult to quantify with certainty the costs of 2017 Gulf crisis, our 
estimations give quite interesting insights. The economic implications of the Qatar’s isolation 
are likely to be costly but short-lived. The GCC crisis has inflicted significant financial loss not 
only on Qatar but also on the boycotting countries (i.e., a lose-lose scenario). Specifically, our 
findings indicate that the equities of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt become 
more volatile and relatively more responsive to bad news. But this volatility does not persist. 
Our findings also document that the profound political instability over Qatar crisis weakly 
exacerbate the stock market volatility transmission across Qatar and the boycotting countries. 
In short, our results suggest that the boycott did not achieve the expected outcome. The fact that 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE responded in the same way (with respect the volatility 
persistence and the directional risk spillovers) to this crisis can be considered as a sign that 
Qatar “beats” the boycott. Doha has demonstrated resilience in times of heightened political 
uncertainty. Despite its economic vulnerability, Qatar has successfully resisted the Saudi-
embargo. More than sixteen months later, the blockaders show no signs of relenting. Many 
factors can explain Qatar’s model of resisting blockade. Using income from its wide gas 
reserves to bankroll its ambitious plans, Qatar has carved out a powerful regional and global 
profile in the past decade, and has been perceived as significant power in the Arab world. In 
response to the blockade, Qatar rebuild its trade ties and food supply chain to pass round imports 
previously received through Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Qatar has also retained the crown of 
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world’s top exporter of liquefied natural gas in 2017, underpinning Qatari cash flow. Further, 
Qatar withstand the harmful effects of the blockaders it growingly emphasizes economic 
relationships outside the Gulf region. This has allowed Doha to replace import trade that came 
by land from Saudi Arabia and by sea from the UAE. Overall, the resilience of this tiny state 
appears as a model on how turning crisis into opportunity. Even though Doha has a long-term 
plan to become less dependent upon gas revenues, there was still a strong reliance on supply 
routes and potential trade partners. The 2017 Gulf crisis forced Qatar to think and act more 
swiftly to determine new supply routes and trade partners. The recent Gulf crisis and its resulted 
diplomatic and economic challenges with other GCC countries has significantly sped up Qatari 
plans and has also strengthened the motivation to take a close attention to self-sufficiency. 
Last but not least, our empirical findings reveal that Qatar diplomatic crisis creates new 
Gulf with no winners. This crisis has further divided the Arab and Muslim world, and forced 
small states to make tough choices. We do not know with certitude how this diplomatic crisis 
will reach a climax and precisely what the long-run ramifications will be. But past imposition 
of boycott gives a practical exhibition of a variety of unanticipated consequences ranging from 
undermining the embargoing countries’ diplomatic influence, to heightened political instability, 
to significant escalation as one or both sides would attempt to erupt a strategic stalemate 
(Doughty and Raugh 1991; Robbins 2013; Colins 2018). With the continuing standoff between 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia, diplomatic and political relationships between several Arab countries 
will likely suffer further damage. It is time for these countries to resolve their differences and 
work on strengthening the GCC macroeconomic outcomes in an uncertain global economy, 
which goes hand in hand with the promotion of democratization. They have the potential, but 
they lack the will to act. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. GARCH models used in this study 
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Notes: 2tσ : conditional variance, 0α : reaction of shock, 1α : ARCH term, 1β : GARCH term, ε  : error term; It: denotes the 
information set available at time t; zt : the standardized value of error term where  11 / −−= tttz σε ;µ : innovation,γ : leverage 
effect;ϕ : power parameter. 
Table A.2. Statistical properties of Kuwaiti and Muscat stock returns:                                       
Before and after the blockade on Qatar 
 KUWAIT OMAN 
Panel A : Period 1 : Before the blockade on Qatar 
 Mean 0.000806 0.001621 
 Median 0.030342 0.041192 
 Maximum 0.116793 0.145847 
 Minimum -1.158281 -0.509544 
 Std. Dev. 0.108400 0.125771 
 Skewness -4.106304 -1.801694 
 Kurtosis 7.85176 6.169026 
 Jarque-Bera 192.9533 41.06505 
 Probability 0.000000 0.000000 
Panel B : Period 2 : After the blockade on Qatar 
 Mean  0.000338 -0.001613 
 Median  0.040166  0.041048 
 Maximum  0.127914  0.133137 
 Minimum -1.625613 -0.589045 
 Std. Dev.  0.131264  0.123171 
 Skewness -5.588247 -1.676758 
 Kurtosis  5.964327  5.930341 
 Jarque-Bera  59.44518  35.36880 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000 
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Fig A. 1. The evolution of Kuwaiti and Muscat stock market returns:                                          
Before and after the blockade 
Panel A. Period 1: Before the blockade on Qatar 
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Panel B. Period 2: After the blockade on Qatar 
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Table A.3. Volatility parameters for Kuwait and Oman :                                               
Before and after the blockade on Qatar 
 KUWAIT OMAN 
Panel A: Period 1: Before blockade on Qatar 
                                          E-GARCH             T-GARCH 
Mean equation 
 
 
0.169** 
(0.0013) 
0.0782* 
(0.0501) 
Lagged returns 0.092*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0452** 
(0.0010) 
Variance equation 
 
 
0.0101*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0413*** 
(0.0001) 
 
 
-0.0501** 
(0.0000) 
-0.131*** 
(0.0000) 
 
 
0.682*** 
(0.0000) 
0.719* 
(0.0351) 
 
-0.065*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.072*** 
(0.0000) 
The duration of persistence: 
 
0.66 0.62 
The leverage effect: 
 
-0.065 -0.072 
Panel B: Period 2: After blockade on Qatar 
                                     T-GARCH                        T-GARCH 
Mean equation 
 
 
0.157*** 
(0.0000) 
0.401*** 
(0.0000) 
Lagged returns 0.121*** 
(0.0003) 
0.067** 
(0.0012) 
Variance equation 
   
 
-0.123*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.115** 
(0.0023) 
 
 
0.156*** 
(0.0000) 
0.098*** 
(0.0004) 
 
 
0.502*** 
(0.0008) 
0.531* 
(0.0137) 
 
-0.055** 
(0.0011) 
-0.014*** 
(0.0007) 
The duration of persistence: 
 
0.68 0.63 
The leverage effect: 
 
-0.055 -0.014 
Notes: : the reaction of conditional variance; α: the ARCH effect; β: the GARCH effect; : the leverage effect; (.): the p-
value; p-value<0.01: ***; p-value<0.05: **; p-value<0.1:*.. With respect to the results of AIC information criterion, we select 
one lag for all the specifications. 
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Fig. A. 2. Conditional variance of Kuwaiti and Muscat stock returns:                        
Before and after the blockade on Qatar 
         Panel A: Period 1: Before the blockade on Qatar Panel B: Period 2: After the blockade on Qatar 
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Table A.4. Stock market volatility spillovers across Qatar and the boycotting countries                   
(+ Kuwait and Oman): Before and after the blockade on Qatar 
 Qatar Bahrain Saudi Arabia UAE Egypt Kuwait Oman 
Contribution 
from others 
Panel A. Period 1: Before the blockade on Qatar   
Qatar 46.7 6.6 12.7 11.5 2.8 10.1 11.3 7.1 
Bahrain 6.5 40.2 7.9 6.3 5.3 3.6 4.1 13.8 
Saudi Arabia 19.4 7.3 57.9 13.4 5.2 9.8 6.0 5.4 
UAE 8.1 5.1 8.3 46.6 4.9 9.4 3.4 4.4 
Egypt 2.2 4.2 5.3 6.5 32.3 8.1 7.4 13.1 
Kuwait 21.3 7.0 8.1 5.9 6.8 42.4 9.4 11.9 
Oman 19.8 4.1 4.6 4.4 4.3 8.7 39.2 12.4 
Contribution to others 22.4 7.2 24.8 22.7 4.1 4.6 2.9 68.1 
Contribution including own 69.1 47.4 82.1 69.3 36.4 47.0 48.6 49.9 
Panel B. Period 2: After the blockade on Qatar 
Qatar 50.0 7.3 13.4 10.7 4.3 11.3 12.4 8.3 
Bahrain 7.2 44.9 8.2 7.9 6.7 4.9 5.3 14.1 
Saudi Arabia 16.8 8.0 61.3 14.1 6.1 10.8 5.8 6.2 
UAE 6.9 6.6 9.0 49.0 5.2 9.9 3.9 5.3 
Egypt 3.0 5.2 6.6 7.1 39.3 9.0 6.8 13.6 
Kuwait 22.4 7.9 9.4 6.2 7.2 44.1 10.6 11.4 
Oman 20.6 5.2 3.8 4.1 5.0 9.3 45.2 13.6 
Contribution to others 23.4 7.6 25.1 23.9 5.5 6.8 4.7 72.5 
Contribution including own 73.4 52.5 86.4 72.9 44.8 50.9 49.9 53.8 
Notes: The values are calculated from variance decompositions based on 1-step-ahead forecasts. The optimal lag length for the 
VAR models is 3 for the two periods under study, determined by the Akaike Information Criterion. 
 
Table A. 5. The average net directional volatility spillovers across Qatar and the boycotting 
countries (+ Kuwait and Oman): Before and after the blockade on Qatar 
  
Contribution from 
others  
Contribution to 
others 
Average net directional 
spillover 
Panel A. Period 1: Before the blockade on Qatar 
Qatar 7.1 22.4 15.6 
Bahrain 13.8 7.2 -6.6 
Saudi Arabia 5.4 24.8 19.4 
UAE 4.4 22.7 18.3 
Egypt 13.1 4.1 -9.0 
Kuwait 11.9 3.6 -8.3 
Oman 12.4 2.9 -9.5 
Panel B. Period 2: After the blockade on Qatar 
Qatar 8.3 23.4 15.1 
Bahrain 14.1 7.6 -6.5 
Saudi Arabia 6.2 25.1 18.9 
UAE 5.3 23.9 18.6 
Egypt 13.6 5.5 -8.1 
Kuwait 11.4 6.8 -4.6 
Oman 13.6 3.7 -9.9 
 
 
 
